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Fiduciary duty has long formed the basis of the relationship of a trustee to the beneficiaries of a trust. The law and economics doctrine of legal
theory, popular in academia and with certain courts, holds that legal relationships are profoundly contractual. The result of such interpretation is
to strip fiduciary duty of its moral footing and to reinterpret it as merely
requiring good faith in the contract sense: a minimal requirement of honesty in fact. This article explores the implications of the contractarian
* Frederick R. Franke, Jr., Annapolis, Maryland, Copyright 2010

517

\\jciprod01\productn\A\ACT\36-3\ACT302.txt

518

unknown

Seq: 2

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

20-APR-11

14:41

[Vol. 36:517

model to the law of trusts, how the Uniform Trust Code handles the issue
and, by way of contrast, how the contractarian model transformed the
fiduciary duties owed by partners under the revised Uniform Partnership
Act.
I. THE NOTION

OF

FIDUCIARY DUTIES

We ought to call one province of the law “Affiliations,” or perhaps, “Relationships.” Contract law is one of its parts. Another is fiduciary duty – the law governing attorneys, trustees,
guardians, corporate directors, and partners. Fiduciary duty
delineates the way in such relationships arise and identifies the
standards of conduct to which a fiduciary must conform, including requirements of loyalty, zeal, and self-sacrifice. A fundamental change in the jurisprudence and ethics of affiliations
is underway, or at least several prominent writers are attempting to work such a change. An insurgent theory asserts that
fiduciary relationships are really contractual in nature.1
For centuries, the fiduciary duties owed by a trustee to his or her
beneficiaries formed the core, indeed definitional, component of a trust,
something arising from the relationship itself. Thus, the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts could confidently proclaim:
A trust . . . is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property,
subjecting the person by whom the title is held to equitable
duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another person . . . .2
This fiduciary relationship, of course, is not the exclusive province
of trust law. It also governs the relation of guardian and ward, agent and
principal, attorney and client, corporate director and shareholder, as
well as the relations among partners.3
Although the fiduciary relation operates in various settings, it is not
identical, or as pronounced, in every situation: “The scope of the trans1 Scott Fitzgibbon, Fiduciary Relationships are not Contracts, 82 MARQ. L. REV.
303 (1999).
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS; § 2
3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 2 cmt. b (“Fiduciary relations include not
only the relation of trustee and beneficiary, but also, among others, those of guardian and
ward, agent and principal, attorney and client.”); A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as
Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931) (All corporate action must be measured
“by equitable rules somewhat analogous to those which apply in favor of the cestui que
trust to the trustee’s exercise of wide powers granted to him in the instrument making
him a fiduciary.”); Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)
(Partners are “bound by fiduciary ties.”).
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actions affected by the relation and the extent of the duties imposed are
not identical in all fiduciary relations. The duties of a trustee are more
intensive than the duties of some other fiduciaries.”4
The traditional treatment of fiduciary duty in the law of partnership, however, closely followed that of the law of trust. Until recently,
the fiduciary duty owed among partners dictated a “duty of finest loyalty” similar to that demanded of a trustee to his or her beneficiary:
Joint adventures, like corporations, owe to one another, while
the enterprise continues the duty of the finest loyalty. Many
forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those
operating at arm’s length are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of
behavior.5
At common law, trust fiduciary law generally “resolves into two
great principles, the duties of loyalty and prudence. . . . Sub-rules of
fiduciary administration abound. . . . All of these rules are subsumed
under the duties of loyalty and prudence, they are means of vindicating
the beneficial interest.”6 Of these two great principles, the duty of loyalty has been described as the “essence” of the fiduciary relationship.7
Loyalty dictates that the trustees act for the sole benefit of the beneficiary: “The duty of loyalty requires the trustee ‘to administer the trust
4

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 2 cmt b.
Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463-4, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo). It is difficult to overestimate the enduring importance of Chief Judge Cardozo’s
decision in Meinhard: “Meinhard has aged well. No case of its period is of comparable
contemporary influence in the business law area. Meinhard is cited today for the power
and vitality of the idea it expresses rather than as a window to an era the values of which
have long since been abandoned. The ‘punctilio of an honor’ precept is as enduring as
any expression of partnership or corporate law and continues to guide courts in determining the duties business partners owe one another. The frequency with which courts cite
Meinhard signals the continuing influence of the idea its expresses, even if its currency
has been devalued in the academic community.” Robert W. Hillman, Business Partners as
Fiduciaries: Reflections on the Limits of Doctrine, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 51, 53 (2000).
Although it may have been somewhat devalued in academia, Meinhard has been cited in
over 1000 cases from the date of the holding in 1928 through 2005. Robert W. Hillman,
Closely-Held Firms and the Common Law of Fiduciary Duty: What Explains the Enduring Qualities of a Punctilio?, 41 TULSA L. REV. 441, 449 (app.) (2006).
6 John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J.
625, 655-6 (1995)[hereinafter Langbein, Contractarian].
7 Karen E. Boxx, Of Punctilios and Paybacks: The Duty of Loyalty Under the Uniform Trust Code, 67 MO. L. REV. 279, 280 (2002) (“The duty of loyalty has been called
‘the essence of the fiduciary relationship’ and even has been considered an expression
synonymous with fiduciary.”).
5
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solely in the interest of the beneficiary.’ This obligation implements the
beneficiaries’ entitlement to the trust assets. The trustee owns the assets,
but only to facilitate the beneficiaries’ enjoyment.”8
Because every partner has an economic interest in the enterprise,
the duty of loyalty in a business venture will not be “solely” for the
benefit of others. Nevertheless, each partner is called upon to act for the
benefit of the enterprise itself not oneself. Justice Cardozo’s pronouncement places the law of partnership, like that of corporations, with the
law of trusts, not with contract.9
II. THE RISE

OF THE

INSURGENCY

A. “Contractarian” Approach
An academic doctrine (an “insurgent theory”) seeks to establish a
contractarian basis for fiduciary relationships with important implications for the continued vitality of that relationship. This doctrine is part
of a larger exercise within academia to view all relationships generally as
a species of contract:
Contract has become the dominant doctrinal current in modern American law. In fields ranging from corporations and
partnership, to landlord and tenant, to servitudes, to the law of
marriage, scholars have come to understand our legal rules as
resting mainly on imputed bargains that are susceptible alteration by actual bargains.10
8 Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 6, at 655. Professor Langbein describes the
other core duty, that of prudence, as follows: “The duty of prudence is a reasonableness
norm, comparable to the reasonable person rule of tort. An objective standard of care
places the trustee ‘under a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust to exercise
such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own
property.’” Id.
9 The law of contract is the law of the market place. Partnership law is not an
isolated example of trust law providing the basis for governance of business organizations
where someone is managing property for the benefit of others. In corporate law, the law
of trusts, including particularly the duty of loyalty, informs a director’s duty: “We are
willing to go further and say that it is possible to conceive of there being only one core
duty (of a corporate director), that of loyalty, and that the duty of care is itself simply a
component of what is expected of a faithful – that is loyal – fiduciary. That is, we think it
uncontroversial that the corporate law duty of loyalty has an affirmative aspect, which
demands that a fiduciary make a good faith effort to advance the best interests of the
corporation and its stockholders. The Hippocratic maxim to first do no harm is of course
relevant to a corporate fiduciary’s role, but, like the role of a physician, the director’s job
demands affirmative action – to protect and to better the position of the corporation.”
Leo E. Strine, Jr., et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in
Corporate Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 635-6 (2010)
10 Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 6, at 630.
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If all relationships are contracts, then all relationships are governed
by the terms of the “deal.” Under such a regime, fiduciary duty becomes simply another term of the implied bargain:
Fiduciary duties are not special duties; they have no moral
footing; they are the same sort of obligations, derived and enforced in the same way, as other contractual undertakings.
*
*
*
Scholars of non - or antieconomic bent have had trouble coming up with a unifying approach to fiduciary duties because
they are looking for the wrong things. They are looking for
something special about fiduciary relations. There are is nothing special to find. . . . Contract law includes a principle of good
faith in implementation – honesty in fact under the Uniform
Commercial Code, plus an obligation to avoid (some) opportunistic advantage taking. Good faith in contract merges into fiduciary duties with a blur and not a line. Searching for the right
definition of a fiduciary duty is not a special puzzle. In short
there is no subject here, and efforts to unify it on a ground that
presumes its distinctiveness are doomed.11
To one urging a strict “contractarian” view of the fiduciary relationship, it would be the contract standard of good faith dealings, not a system of moral norms, that should regulate these relationships. These are
radically different concepts:
In general, the contracting party’s duty of good faith establishes nothing like the full panoply of fiduciary obligations.
Judge Posner says as much in one of his judicial opinions:
’The particular confusion to which the vaguely moralistic overtones of “good faith” give rise is the belief that every contract
establishes a fiduciary relationship. A fiduciary is required to
treat his principal as if the principal were he, and therefore he
may not take advantage of the principal’s incapacity, ignorance, inexperience, or even naiveté. . . . But it is unlikely that
Wisconsin wishes, in the name of good faith, to make every
contract signatory his brother’s keeper. . . . In fact the law contemplates that people frequently will take advantage of the ignorance of those with whom they contract, without thereby
incurring liability. . . . [E]ven after you have signed a contract,
you are not obliged to become an altruist “toward the other
party.”12
11 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L.
& ECON. 425, 427 & 438 (1993).
12 Fitzgibbon, supra note 1, at 324.
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Whether, or to what extent, fiduciary duty as a separate and standalone, non-contract principle should continue to play a pivotal role in
trust and partnership law has been debated over the course of the past
few decades.13 Both the Uniform Trust Code and the revised Uniform
Partnership Act were written at the time, and against the general backdrop, of the academic debate reinterpreting all relationships as essentially contractual in nature.
B. The Uniform Trust Code
The Uniform Trust Code provides that the traditional fiduciary obligations operate as default rules that can be modified somewhat by the
trust agreement.14 This very approach suggests a contractarian approach to the law of trusts.15 Certain rules, however, are non-modifiable, including the ability of any trust agreement to alter the “duty of a
trustee to act in good faith and in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries.”16 Although this
13 This debate has generated more than a few articles. Some of the articles related to
trusts include: Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 6; Fitzgibbon, supra note1; Boxx,
supra note 7; Melanie B. Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of
Default Rules, 94 GEO. L.J. 67 (2005)[hereinafter Leslie, Trusting Trustees]; Arthur B.
Laby, The Fiduciary Obligation as the Adoption Ends, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 99 (2008). Some
of the articles related to business organizations include: Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond
Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879 (1988); Henry N.
Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the AntiContractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990); J. Dennis Hynes, Freedom of Contract, Fiduciary Duties, and Partnerships: The Bargain Principle and the Law of Agency, 54 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 439 (1997); Allan W. Vestal, Fundamental Contractarian Error in the
Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1992, 73 B. U. L. REV. 523 (1993)[hereinafter Vestal,
Fundamental Contractarian Error]; Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Naked Emperor: A Corporate Lawyer Looks at RUPA’s Fiduciary Provisions, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 465
(1997)[hereinafter Mitchell, The Naked Emperor]; Allan W. Vestal, “Assume a Rather
Large Boat . . .’: The Mess We Have Made of Partnership Law, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
487 (1997); Hillman, supra note 5.
14 UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 801-804; 105(b) (2005).
15 “Of course, parties to a trust instrument may, to a considerable extent, tailor a
trustee’s fiduciary duties to facilitate the settlor’s objectives. But it is a long leap from the
proposition that fiduciary duties can be tailored to further individual objectives to the
conclusion that fiduciary duties are merely gap-filling default rules, similar to those found
in the Uniform Commercial Code’s (”U.C.C.“) Article Two.” Leslie, Trusting Trustees,
supra note 13, at 69. According to Professor Leslie, one consequence of embracing a
contractarian view is that it may dislodge fiduciary duty from its moral/equitable moorings: “[L]abeling fiduciary duties ‘default rules’ threatens to strip fiduciary rules of their
moral content. Fiduciary duties are most effective when they function both as legal rules
and moral norms. A label that equates the duty of loyalty with, say, a U.C.C. provision
allocating risk of loss undermines the duty’s normative force.” Id. at 70.
16 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(2) (2005). The Reporter for the U.T.C. explains the
purpose of providing default rules backstopped by non-modifiable provisions: “Most
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rule is framed in what may sound like contractarian vocabulary (“good
faith”), it is in fact close to the classic formulation of the fiduciary duty
of loyalty.17 The Uniform Trust Code may be “permeated with (contractarian) default rule rhetoric”18 but it came out solidly in the anticontractarian camp by rejecting a pure “good faith” standard in the contract, Uniform Commercial Code, sense.19
C. The Revised Uniform Partnership Act
The revised Uniform Partnership Act, on the other hand, has embraced a purely contractarian model that strips out fiduciary duty as the
broad governing principle law of partnership. It limits the fiduciary duty
owed among partners to a duty of loyalty and care as those terms are
narrowly defined by the act.20 Instead of broad fiduciary duties as deAmerican trust law consists of rules subject to override by the terms of the trust. But,
prior to the U.T.C., neither the Restatements, treatise writers, nor state legislatures had
attempted to comprehensively list the principles of law not subject to override by the
trust terms. The U.T.C. collects these principles in Section 105(b).” David M. English,
The New Mexico Uniform Trust Code, 34 N.M. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2005).
17 “Close to” but not exactly equal to the fiduciary duty of loyalty. “The duty of
loyalty requires a trustee ‘to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary.’
This ‘sole interest’ rule is widely regarded as ‘the most fundamental’ rule of trust law.”
John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole or Best Interest?, 114
YALE L.J. 929, 931 (2005) [hereinafter Langbein, Questioning the Duty of Loyalty] (a rule
that Professor Langbein considers “unsound”). See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(a) (2005)
for the classic definition of the duty of loyalty with the obligation to administer the trust
“solely” in the interest of the beneficiary. The extent a trust instrument can modify or
eliminate the “sole” benefit rule has broad-sweeping implications, including the impact
on the no-further-inquiry approach to self dealing. See Melanie B. Leslie, Common Law,
Common Sense: Fiduciary Standards and Trustee Identity, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2713
(2006).
18 Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra note 13, at 71.
19 Somewhat similarly, under Delaware corporate law, “good faith” is used as an
element of the duty of loyalty: “[T]he term good faith has long been used as the key
element in defining the state of mind that must motivate a loyal fiduciary. To wit, the
duty of loyalty most fundamentally requires that a corporate fiduciary’s actions be undertaken in the good faith belief that they are in the best interests of the corporation and its
stockholders . . . For these reasons, it has been traditional for the duty of loyalty to be
articulated capaciously, in a manner that emphasizes not only the obligation of a loyal
fiduciary to refrain from advantaging herself at the expense of the corporation but, just as
importantly, to act affirmatively to further the corporation’s best interest. In this respect,
our law has been clear that the duty of loyalty is implicated by all director actions because all such actions must be undertaken in good faith to advance the corporation’s best
interests and because directors owe an affirmative obligation to put in a good faith effort
to responsibly carry out their duties.” Strine, et al., supra note 9, at 633-4 (2010).
20 REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404, cmt.(amended 1997): “Section 404 begins
by stating that the ONLY fiduciary duties a partner owes to the partnership and the other
partners are the duties of loyalty and care set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of the Act.
Those duties may not be waived or eliminated in the partnership agreement, but the
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fault provisions, the revised Uniform Partnership Act mandates that a
partner exercise his or her duties and rights under the partnership agreement consistent “with the obligation of good faith and fair dealing” – a
contract standard of conduct similar, but not exactly the same, to that of
the Uniform Commercial Code.21
Both the Uniform Trust Code and the revised Uniform Partnership
Act reflect the doctrinal force of the contractarian worldview. The Uniform Trust Code, however, is largely a codification of the long-standing
common law trust principles framed by the contractarian rhetoric.22 In
contrast, the Revised Uniform Partnership Act essentially trades in
long-standing partnership law fiduciary principles for a purely contractual model. How “good faith” is used, and what it means, under the two
uniform acts puts in high relief the stakes involved in shifting from a
relational to a contractarian model. Indeed, the developing case law
under the Revised Partnership Act should serve as a cautionary tale for
those concerned with the future of the law of trusts.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AND THE THEORETICAL
CASE FOR TRUST AS CONTRACT
A. The Trust As Fiduciary Relationship
Historically, a trust was seen as coterminous with the fiduciary duty
owed by the trustee; it was defined by the duty of the trustee to the
beneficiary:
I should define a trust in some such way as the following –
when a person has rights which he is bound to exercise on behalf of another or for the accomplishment of some purpose he
agreement may indentify activities and determine standards for measuring performance
of the duties if not manifestly unreasonable. See Section 103(b)(3)-(5) . . . Arguably, the
term ‘fiduciary’ is inappropriate when used to describe the duties of a partner because a
partner may legitimately pursue self-interest (see Section 404(e)) and not solely the interest of the partnership and the other partners, as must a true trustee.” (Emphasis in
original).
21 REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404(d) (amended 1997). “The obligation of good
faith and fair dealing is a contract concept, imposed on the partners because of the consensual nature of a partnership. . . It is not characterized, in RUPA, as a fiduciary duty
arising out of the partners’ special relationship. Nor is it a separate and independent
obligation. It is an ancillary obligation that applies whenever a partner discharges a duty
or exercises a right under the partnership agreement or the Act.” Id. The revised Act did
not incorporate the U.C.C. definitions of good faith under U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19) and 2103(b): “Those definitions were regarded as too narrow or not applicable.” Id., cmt.
22 “The U.T.C. does not make sweeping changes in the common law of trusts, but
neither does it woodenly copy the previous judge-made law.” David M. English, The
Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions and Policy Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 143,
153 (2002).
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is said to have those rights in trust for that other or for that
other purpose and he is called a trustee.23
The law of trust arose in the fourteenth century: the “ancestor of the
modern trust (the feoffment to uses), enjoyed a popularity at least from
the reign of Edward III (1327-1377).”24 Originally, enforcement of uses
fell to the courts of the Church of England which used canon law to
regulate the conduct of the trustee (the feoffee).25 In the fifteenth century, Chancery took over the role of enforcing these antecedents to the
modern trust.26 The evolution from the ecclesiastic courts to Chancery
carried forward the application of canon-law-based norms to the Equity
Courts.27 Presumably, these ecclesiastic origins count, at least in part,
for the moralistic overlay that informs the fiduciary duty of trustees.28
B. The Trust As Contract
The most prominent advocate of a contractarian view of trusts, Professor John H. Langbein, points to the deficiencies of the early law
courts as to why the law of trusts was not initially treated as a contract:
Recall Maitland’s insight that ‘a trust generally has its origin in
something that we cannot but call an agreement.’ Maitland
was asking why the early law did not immediately assimilate
the trust to the law of contract. His answer has never been
doubted. The common law of contract was too primitive to do
the job: “If . . . in the 14th century our law of contract had
taken its modern form, I think that the courts of law would
have been compelled to say ‘yes, there is an agreement; therefore it is a legal enforceable contract.’29
23 FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: A COURSE OF LECTURES (A.H. Chaytor &
W.J. Whittaker eds., 1st ed. 1909, reprinted Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1999), 44.
24 R. H. Helmholz, The Early Enforcement of Uses, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1503 (1979).
25 Id. At 1504-5.
26 Id. At 1512.
27 “The evolution of the enforcement of uses from the ecclesiastical to Chancery
jurisdiction serves as an example of the role that canon law has played in the growth and
development of our common law. Modern students of legal history may regard it as part
of the long continuing absorption into the secular law of remedies once available only in
the courts of the Church. The rise of the Chancery jurisdiction over feoffees to uses is
not, therefore, the story of the creation of a legal remedy where previously there had
been none. Rather it is the story of continuing enforcement in a new setting.” Id., at 1513.
28 “Beginning in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, beneficiaries increasingly turned for justice to the Chancellor who granted relief on the theory that he
was ‘compelling the trustee to act upon the dictates of his conscience.’ In other words, the
Chancellor’s role was to force the trustee to abide by his pre-existing moral or ethical
obligation. . .Thus, the duty of loyalty developed as an equitable doctrine to support and
enforce pre-existing moral norms.” Leslie, Trusting Trustees, supra note 13, at 73.
29 Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 6, at 634.
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Despite the actual historical origin of the law of trusts and the imprint
that this history made on that law, Professor Langbein sees the enforcement of trusts as more properly a part of the law of contract: ”In truth,
the trust is a deal, a bargain about how the estate assets are to be managed and distributed.“30 Thus, the role of fiduciary duty is nothing special, has no moral footing, and is merely a contract obligation:
[D]espite decades of pulpit-thumping rhetoric about the sanctity of fiduciary obligations, fiduciary duties in trust law are
unambiguously contractarian. The rules of trust fiduciary law
mean to capture the likely understanding of the parties to the
trust deal, which is why both the duty of loyalty and the duty of
prudence yield to more particularized intentions that the parties may choose to express or imply in their trust deal. I depict
the default regime of trust law as a type of standardized contract, and I point to some instances in which the contractarian
perspective should improve outcomes in trust law.31
The law governing fiduciary duty, however, came by its “pulpit-thumping” roots honestly and those roots serve the “institutional integrity” of
the trust and its progeny.32
IV. GOOD FAITH

NATURE OF THE TRUSTEE’S DUTIES
COMMON LAW

AND THE

AT

A. The Good Faith Standard
Under the Uniform Trust Code, regardless of the terms of the instrument, a trustee has a duty “to act in good faith and in accordance
with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries.”33 The good faith formulation, of course, was one of the traditional grounds for courts to intervene and take corrective action in
abuse of discretion cases:
30

Id., at 62.
Id., at 629. The leap from a contract theory of trust law to the view that fiduciary
duties are merely default rules is recent: “Although the argument that trusts are a species
of contract has existed for at least a century, the precise characterization of fiduciary
duties as mere ‘default rules’ crystallized only in the past fifteen years.” Leslie, Trusting
Trustees, supra note 13, at 76.
32 Although decrying the pulpit-thumping rhetoric that surrounds fiduciary duty,
Professor Langbein states that his contractarian analysis is not meant “to fold the law of
trusts into the law of contract” because “the trust has an institutional integrity and convenience that fully justifies its jurisprudence.” Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 6, at 630.
Part of that integrity, presumably, arises from the success that has been achieved by the
common law in defining the fiduciary duty owed by trustees in moralistic terms.
33 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(2) (2005).
31
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[E]quity has established certain limitations on this doctrine (of
non-intervention) which are deemed to be necessary to prevent the frustration of the settlor’s intent and inequitable conduct by the trustee.
*
*
*
Many courts describe the cases where they review and upset
the trustee’s use of discretionary powers as those involving “an
abuse of discretion,” “bad faith,” “dishonesty,” or “arbitrary”
action. It is believed that these phrases cover a variety of improper actions, for example, acting for the benefit of the trustee himself, or some third person, or for the purpose of
harming the beneficiary or out of ill will or prejudice against
him, or an action contrary to the purpose of the trust.34
When applying the good faith test, courts looked to whether the
trustee exercised his or her discretion “reasonably.” Thus, in ordinary
situations, a trustee must exercise his or her discretion in “good faith”
and “reasonably.” Reasonableness is generally viewed as an objective
standard – something that a court could review and opine upon.35 It
would seem obvious that both “good faith” and “reasonableness”
should be measured – in all cases – by the overall intent of the settler:
Even when the trustee has discretion, however, the court will
not permit him to abuse the discretion. This ordinarily means
that so long as he acts not only in good faith and from proper
motives, but also within the bounds of reasonable judgment,
the court will not interfere; but the court will interfere when he
acts outside the bounds of reasonable judgment.36
B. Good Faith and Extended Discretion
In some trusts, however, the settlor appears to grant discretion
without any standard or measurement of the settlor’s intent. In those
cases, the settlor grants extended discretion (“absolute” or “unlimited”
or “uncontrolled” discretion). Extended discretion, according to the
34

GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
TRUSTEES § 560 (rev. 2d ed. 1980).
35 For tort liability, for example, reasonable care and a reasonable person standard
is used that is free from subjective interpretation: “The [reasonable person] standard . . .
must be an objective and external one, rather than that of the individual judgment, good
or bad, of the particular individual . . . [The standard] affords a formula by which, so far
as possible, a uniform standard may be maintained.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 283 cmt. c (1965). See Kristin Harlow, Applying the Reasonable Person Standard to
Psychosis: How Tort Law Unfairly Burdens Adults with Mental Illness, 68 OHIO L.J. 1733
(2007).
36 3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 187 (3d ed. 1967).
AND
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first two Restatements of Trusts, obviates the requirement that the trustee act reasonably:
The mere fact that that the trustee is given discretion does not
authorize him to act beyond the bounds of a reasonable judgment. The settlor, may, however, manifest an intention that
the trustee’s judgment need not be exercised reasonably, even
where there is a standard by which the reasonableness of the
trustee’s conduct can be judged. This may be indicated by a
provision in the trust instrument that the trustee shall have
“absolute” or “unlimited” or “uncontrolled” discretion. These
words are not interpreted literally but are ordinarily construed
as merely dispensing with the standard of reasonableness. In
such a case the mere fact that the trustee has acted beyond the
bounds of a reasonable judgment is not a sufficient ground for
interposition by the court, so long as the trustee acts in a state
of mind in which it was contemplated by the settlor that he
would act. But the court will interfere if the trustee acts in a
state of mind not contemplated by the settlor. Thus, the trustee will not be permitted to act dishonestly, or from some motive other than the accomplishment of the purposes of the
trust, or ordinarily to act arbitrarily without an exercise of his
judgment.37
In his treatise, Professor Scott distils the test to the “state of mind
not contemplated” standard: “The real question is whether it appears
that the trustee is acting in a state of mind in which it was contemplated
by the settlor that he should act.”38 This shift away from “reasonableness” would appear to embrace subjective criteria which, by its nature,
would be difficult for a court to second-guess. It reduces the standard to
a test of whether an abuse of discretion has occurred, in trusts providing
for of extended trustee discretion, to whether the power was exercised
or, for that matter not exercised, in bad faith or through some other
showing of improper motive and not in the state of mind contemplated
by the settler that he or she would act.
In practice, however, the courts impose a reasonableness standard
regardless of whether the discretion is extended or absolute despite the
early treatment in the first two Restatements:
The authorities do not appear to support the Restatement position that there is no requirement of reasonableness in the exercise of a power granted in the trustee’s absolute discretion.
37 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS and RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
§ 187, cmts.j.
38 SCOTT, supra note 36, § 187.

OF

TRUSTS
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Most courts have held that the exercise of an absolute power is
subject to the court’s review and determination as to whether
the power had been unreasonably exercised by the trustee.39
*
*
*
It would appear that the difference in the attitude of the courts
towards “simple” discretionary powers, on the one hand, and
“absolute” or “uncontrolled” discretionary powers, on the
other hand, is one of degree rather than kind. The courts appear more likely to find an abuse of a simple discretionary
power than an abuse of an absolute or uncontrolled discretionary power. In addition to the commonly recognized factors
used to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion, a standard of reasonableness has been applied by the
courts in judging the exercise of a discretionary power
(whether simple or absolute), a standard implied from the settlor’s intent and the purposes expressed in the trust instrument.
With respect to court review of discretionary powers, this standard is consistent with the standard of care and skill of a prudent man and is based upon established fiduciary standards
and principles.40
Professor Halbach reached the same conclusion in his seminal 1961
article: that “reasonableness” was, in fact, required in every case involving extended discretion, but usually the courts framed the discussion
under “the state of mind contemplated by the settlor” standard:
[I]n numerous cases the trustee’s ‘absolute’ or ‘controlled’ discretion has been overturned on much the same ground as that
on which simple discretions have often been upset – typically,
unreasonably small payments to the beneficiary. Such cases
can be interpreted as coming within the Restatement formulation requiring the trustee to act in the ‘state of mind’ . . . contemplated by the settlor, ‘and the modern opinions, almost
without exception, have expressed their results in these terms
when interfering with the trustee’s judgment. Even though language in the decisions tends to perpetuate the Restatement’s
wording of the rule, any distinction between the test of reasonableness and the state-of-mind test is difficult to discern from
the holdings of these cases. In fact, the requirements set out in
the dicta of some cases, phrased in terms of requiring ‘reasona39

BOGERT, supra note 34, § 560.
GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, ET
(rev. 2d ed. Cum. Supp. 2009).
40

AL.,

THE LAW

OF

TRUSTS

AND

TRUSTEES § 560
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ble judgment’ and ‘sound discretion,’ go far in obliterating any
such distinction.41
If good faith was purely subjective (the “pure heart” test), enforcement would illusory – effectively negating the trust. Trusts presuppose
giving enforceable rights to beneficiaries. In a Delaware case, for example, the trust instrument stated that distributions by a committee of
trustees were “not subject to review by any court.” In that case, the
court ignored the provision: “A trust where there is no binding legal
obligation on a trustee is a trust in name only and more in the nature of
an absolute estate or fee simple grant of property.”42
C. Immutable Good Faith
The non-modifiable Uniform Trust Code good faith standard, like
the standard traditionally governing extended discretion under common
law, is applied in a way to implement the settlor’s intent and to benefit
the beneficiaries. As such, it implies the reasonable exercise of discretion. This immutability mirrors the approach of the Restatement (Third)
of Trusts:
§ 50. Enforcement and Construction of Discretionary Interests
(1) A discretionary power conferred upon the trustee to
determine the benefits of a trust beneficiary is subject to judicial control only to prevent misinterpretation or abuse of the
discretion by the trustee.
41 Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Problems of Discretion in Discretionary Trusts, 61
COLUM. L REV. 1425, 1429 (1961), Professor Halbach’s article followed the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts by two years but collects and discusses cases that largely substantiate
the discussion of the enforcement of discretionary trusts contained in § 50 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts. That this is so, of course, should come as no surprise as Professor
Halbach is its Reporter. The cases that Professor Halbach discusses in his article should
put to rest any suggestion that the Restatement (Third) of Trusts radically departed from
existing law in this regard.
42 McNeil v. McNeil, 798 A.2d 503, 509 (Del. Super. Ct. 2002). There are potential
adverse federal tax consequences if a trustee cannot be held to a reasonability standard
as to discretionary distributions. One of the exceptions to grantor income tax inclusion,
for example, requires that a power to appoint must be under a reasonably definite, ascertainable standard: “[I]f a trust instrument provides that the determination of the trustee
shall be conclusive with respect to the exercise or non-exercise of a power, the power is
not limited by a reasonably definite standard.” Treas. Reg. § 1.674(b)-1(b)(5)(i). A similar position could be advanced for federal gift and estate tax purposes. Thus when drafting provisions giving a trustee, who is also a beneficiary, distribution discretion under
“ascertainable standards,” it may be prudent not to use extended discretion language.
Generally, of course, a trust without the trustee’s obligation to account is not a trust: “A
settler who attempts to create a trust without any accounting in the trustee is contradicting himself. A trust necessarily grants rights to the beneficiary that are enforceable in
equity.” BOGERT, supra note 34, at § 974.
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(2) The benefits to which a beneficiary of a discretionary
interest is entitled, and what may constitute an abuse of discretion by the trustee, depend on the terms of the discretion, including the proper construction of any accompanying
standards, and on the settlor’s purposes in granting the discretionary power and in creating the trust.43
Thus, where under § 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, a
trustee’s exercise or non-exercise of a discretionary power is only subject to review upon a showing of “abuse,” now under § 50 of the Restatement (Third), a trustee may be second guessed by a court if the
trustee’s exercise of a discretionary power was grounded in a “misinterpretation” or the “abuse” of the discretion, and “abuse” is broadly defined. In either event, the standard governing trustee conduct,
regardless of whether such trustee enjoyed extended discretion, was
never simply that of good faith alone but good faith in reasonably implementing the settlor’s intent for the benefit of the beneficiary.44
Neither under the Uniform Trust Code, or at common law, is good
faith used in the contract law sense. Although “good faith” forms an
important role under the Uniform Trust Code, it is not a defined term
and one would expect the courts to continue to use the extensive body
of the common law of trusts for an understanding of its sense and defini-

43

THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUTS, § 50 (2003).
Critics of the approach adopted by the Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the
Uniform Trust Code perceived that there was a change from the common law of trusts
and that this change exposed trust assets to heightened exposure to the claims of the
beneficiaries’ creditors. Mark Merric & Steven J. Oshins, Effect of the UTC on the Asset
Protection of Spendthrift Trusts, 31 EST. PLAN. 375 (2004). This criticism has drawn pronounced refutation. Kevin D. Millard, RIGHTS OF A TRUST BENEFICIARIES UNDER THE
UNIFORM TRUST CODE, 34 ACTEC J. 57, 63 (2008)(“[N]ote that the theory that a creditor could not reach the trust because the creditor stood in the shoes of the beneficiary
and the beneficiary could not force distributions from the trust was flawed, because no
matter how broadly worded the trustee’s discretion was, it was always subject to review
by a court for abuse.”); Robert T. Danforth, Article Five of the UTC and the Future of
Creditors’ Rights in Trusts, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2551, 2581 (2006)(“Implicit in the critics’ argument is the assertion that, by granting a trustee extended discretion, the trustee’s
exercise of that discretion becomes essentially unreviewable. But this has never been true
at common law. An essential principle of the common law of trusts is that a trustee’s
exercise of discretion is always subject to judicial review, no matter how broadly the
trustee’s discretion may be described. . .[T]hat will not be interpreted so as to relieve the
trustee from an obligation to account for its discretionary judgments. Because a trustee is
a fiduciary, it would be inconsistent with the concept of a trust to insulate a trustee’s
exercise of discretion from all judicial review.”); see also Alan Newman, Spendthrift and
Discretionary Trusts: Alive and Well Under the Uniform Trust Code, 40 REAL PROP.,
PROB. & TR. J., 567, 601-618 (2005).
44
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tion.45 Whether in the context of a non-modifiable baseline rule under
Section 105(b)(3) or when defining the limits of absolute discretion
under Section 814(a), good faith under the Uniform Trust Code should
be understood in its traditional trust sense. It approximates the common
law of trusts and, by wedding good faith to the settlor’s intent and the
interests of the beneficiaries, it dances back to a general fiduciary duty
that cannot be modified by the terms of the agreement: “[A] settlor may
not so negate the responsibilities of the trustee that the trustee would no
longer be acting in the fiduciary capacity.”46
45 Professor Langbein (one of the Uniform Trust Code drafters), however, suggests
that one look to the body of law in contract discussing the meaning of “good faith.” John
H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105, at note 96
(2004) (directing one to a treatise by Professor Robert S. Summers for “a succinct account of the nuances developed in contract law . . . emphasizing the core notion of honest
dealing.”)[hereinafter Langbein, Mandatory Rules]. Professor Summers’ view of “good
faith” as it has developed in contract law will be discussed below.
46 UNIF. TRUST CODE §105, cmt. (2005). Within limits, of course, section 105 permits
modification of the basic fiduciary duties, including the duty of loyalty. Sections 105(b)(3)
and 814(a) provide absolute backstops to the ability to modify such duties by prohibiting
the elimination of the obligation to act in good faith and in accordance with the terms
and purposes of the trust and in the interests of its beneficiaries. The “missing” piece of
this litany, if you will, is the obligation to act in the “sole” interest of the beneficiaries.
This opens the door to permitting trustees to engage in acts of self-interest as long as the
activity is in the best interest of the trust beneficiaries. Langbein, Questioning the Duty of
Loyalty, supra note 17; Melanie B. Leslie, In Defense of the No Further Inquiry Rule: A
Response to Professor Langbein, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 541 (2005). The benefit-thebeneficiaries rule is mandatory. Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 45, at 1112(“A
default rule is one that the settler can abridge, but only to the extent the settler’s term is
‘for the benefit of [the] beneficiaries.’ The requirement that there be benefit to the beneficiaries sets the outer limits on the settlor’s power to abridge the default law.”). Coupled
with the modern portfolio theory of trust investing, the benefit-the-beneficiary rule may
cause difficulties when a settlor wishes to have a trust hold a particular asset instead of a
broad array of assets and asset classes. Jeffrey A. Cooper, Empty Promises: Settlor’s
Intent, the Uniform Trust Code, and the Future of Trust Investment Law, 88 B. U. L. REV.
1165, 1168 (2008)(“Under Professor Langbein’s formulation of the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule, the ‘benefit’ of a trust provision is determined by reference to objective notions of prudence and efficiency rather than the settlor’s subjective intent. Carried to its
logical extreme, this emerging reading of the benefit-the beneficiary rule (the ‘emerging
rule’) could redefine the area of trust investment management. Trust documents frequently include specific investment management directives, such as a mandate that the
trustee retain a certain portfolio investment or family business. Whereas trust law historically has honored such restrictions, the emerging rule seemingly would enforce only those
which maximize economic value for the trust beneficiaries. If the settlor’s chosen restrictions fail this objective test of economic benefit, they simply can be cast aside.”); Benjamin H. Pruett, Tales from the Dark Side: Drafting Issues from the Fiduciary’s Perspective,
35 ACTEC J. 331, 352 (2009)(“These provisions (the benefit-the-beneficiary rules) leave
open the possibility that any provision of a trust that deviates from normal fiduciary
practice might be found to be ‘out of bounds’ on the grounds that such a provision vio-
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Indeed, the standards regulating a trustee’s exercise of discretion as
to beneficiary distributions is generally seen as the exercise of fiduciary
duty:
A trustee’s discretionary power with respect to trust benefits is
to be distinguished from a power of appointment. The latter is
not subject to fiduciary obligations and may be exercised arbitrarily within the scope of the power.47
It is the fiduciary nature of the exercise of discretion that guarantees
review and regulation by the Courts: “[N]o language, however strong,
will entirely remove any power held in trust from the reach of a Court of
Equity.”48
V. GOOD FAITH

IN

CONTRACT

A. The Absence of Bad Faith
The concept of “good faith and fair dealing” in the performance of
contracts is a mandatory aspect of all contract law: “Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”49 Good faith is generally viewed as the
absence of bad faith:
[W]hat meaning have the courts and the Code draftsman given
to the phrase “good faith”? It will be argued that good faith,
as used in the case law, is best understood as an “excluder” – it
is a phrase which has no general meaning or meanings of its
own, but which serves to exclude many heterogeneous forms of
bad faith.50
lates the rule that the trust provisions must be ‘in the interest of’ and ‘for the benefit of’
the beneficiaries.”).
47 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 cmt. a (2003).
48 Stix v. Comm., 152 F.2d 562, 563 (2nd Cir. 1945) (J. Learned Hand) (A case involving a trust providing the trustee with “sole and exclusive discretion.”). The modern
fusion of equity and law courts supplies Professor Langbein with an additional support
for his view that trusts should be treated as contracts. Langbein, Contractarian, supra
note 6, at 649(“Scott was alarmed over the movement then underway to bring about the
fusion of law and equity in American civil procedure and judicial administration. He was
worried that the fusion might remove the law of trusts from the nurturing hand of the
specialist equity bench, and indeed, that fusion might cause trust litigation to be subjected
to jury trial. In England and most leading American jurisdictions, the law of trusts had
been the province of separate equity courts or equity divisions. . . Two generations later,
with the place of jury-free equitable jurisdiction over trusts now secure in our fused civil
procedure, we can safely acknowledge the contractarian character of the modern trust.”).
49 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).
50 Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and Sales Provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 196 (1968). Professor Summers’
article was the basis of the understanding of the nature of good faith in contract as set out
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This negative definition of good faith (the absence of bad faith) arose
from Professor Robert S. Summers’ examination of case law, an examination that informed the treatment of good faith in contract in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Judges, he found, used the good faith
requirement to perform a safety valve function to regulate behavior, if
not directly violating the explicit terms of a contract then violating the
spirit of the contract, often frustrating the justified expectations of the
parties to the deal.51 Yet, the good faith standard in contract “is no
more than a minimal requirement (rather than a high ideal).”52
The law and economics practitioners embrace the view that only a
minimal, perhaps negligible, ethical standard underpins the concept of
good faith in contract law:
Contract law does not require parties to act altruistically toward each other; it does not proceed on the philosophy that I
am my brother’s keeper. That philosophy may animate the law
of fiduciary obligations but parties to a contract are not each
other’s fiduciaries.53
In practice, the good faith standard, by operating as an excluder of bad
faith, necessarily focuses on the subject of intent of the acting party.
Professor Steven J. Burton uses an example that illustrates the inherently subjective nature of good faith as it is used in the law of conin the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of Contract: A Reply to Professor Summers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 497, 498
(1984)(“The drafters of the Restatement (Second) surely exercised good judgment in
1970 by recognizing the good faith performance obligation and by explaining it largely on
the basis of Professor Summers’ work.”) Given Professor Summers minimalistic view of
good faith, it is disturbing that Professor Langbein points to him as a source of defining
that concept for the law of trusts. See note 45.
51 Summers, supra note 50, at 262-6.
52 Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith–Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 811 (1982)[hereinafter Summers, “General
Duty”].
53 Original Great American Chocolate Chip Cookie Co., Inc. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 280 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.). Judge Posner’s view is within the
mainstream of the common law of contract: “One commentator recently expressed
strong concern that courts may likely overextend a general requirement of good faith of
the kind embodied in (Restatement (Second) of Contracts) § 205, the Comments, and the
Reporter’s Note, all in the name of altruism, Good Samaritanism, general benevolence,
moral idealism or the like. The shortest answer to this concern is that the extensive case
law to date does not reveal any significant tendencies of this kind. . .The risk of overextension is inherent in any doctrine. Experience to date indicates that the risk is not great
with regard to section 205. This is hardly surprising. Our contract law has been relatively
free from moralism, especially any forms legitimately described as ”Good Samaritanism“
or the like. Moreover, legal good faith is not identical with moral good faith.” Summers,
General Duty, supra note 52, at 834.
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tract.54 A landlord and a tenant agree to base commercial rent
payments on the amount of the tenant’s sales at the leased store. Assume, however, that the tenant has two stores, one leased from the landlord and one the tenant owns in the same town. If the tenant diverts
customers away from the leased premises to his own store for the “’sole
purpose’ of bringing gross receipts down at the leased premises, there is
good authority for concluding that (the tenant) breached the contract.”
If, on the other hand, the diversion of customers was because the store
inventories differ and the customers would be better served at the other
store, no breach occurs: “Consequently, it is necessary to focus on attention on whether the discretion – exercising party used its discretion
for an improper purpose, despite the well-known difficulties of an inquiry into subjective intent.”55
The good faith standard, in itself, does not alter, or extend, the
terms of the contract – it merely prohibits conduct that frustrates the
explicit agreement:
Illinois like other states requires, as a matter of common law,
that each party to a contract act with good faith, and some Illinois cases say that the test for good faith “seems to center on a
determination of commercial reasonability.” The equation,
tentative though it is (“seems to center on”) makes it sound as
if, contrary to our earlier suggestion, the judges have carte
blanche to declare contractual provisions negotiated by competent adults unreasonable and refuse to enforce them. We understand the duty of good faith in contract law differently.
There is no blanket duty in good faith; nor is reasonableness
the test of good faith.56
Thus, good faith merely polices subjective bad conduct in the performance of the contact. It is in this sense that good faith in contract is intention-implementing. It is in this sense that Professor Burton reports: “In
my view, courts generally do not use the good faith performance doctrine to override the agreement of the parties. Rather, the good faith
performance doctrine is used to effectuate the intentions of the parties,
or to protect reasonable expectations, through interpretation and
implication.”57
54 Professor Burton’s work commands attention if only because it, along with that
by Professor Summers, forms Professor Langbein’s frame of reference for the good faith
model he advances for trusts. See Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 6, at 655.
55 Burton, supra note 50, at 502-3.
56 Original Great American Chocolate Chip Cookie Co., Inc. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd. , 970 F. 2d 273, 279-80 (7th Cir. 1992)(Posner, J.).
57 Burton, supra note 50, at 499.
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B. Application (or Misapplication) to Trusts
If a trustee’s fiduciary duty is merely a contract term, susceptible to
waiver, then good faith in performance of the “deal” is the only immutable, trust value. This approach would be compatible with the interpretation of fiduciary duty espoused by Judge Easterbrook and Professor
Fischel: “Fiduciary duties are not special duties.”58 Professor Langbein
embraces the “contractarian vision of the trust” as a useful way “to account for the trust more accurately.”59 He seems willing to transpose
good faith in contract as the basis for regulating trustee discretion: “The
good faith standard in contract law echoes the norms of trust fiduciary
law, which regulate the trustee’s embedded discretion in performing the
trust deal.”60 He does not, however, go so far as to argue that fiduciary
duty can be eliminated in favor of a mere obligation to act in good faith
under the contract law standard. Fiduciary duty may be highly alterable
by a settlor, but a settlor may not dispense with fiduciary obligations
altogether:
Oddly, however, although the various fiduciary rules are default rules, the settlor may not abrogate them in their entirety,
because eliminating all fiduciary duties would make the trust
illusory.61
*
*
*
In this way, the requirement that the trust must have enforceable duties has the consequence of placing aggregate limits on
the manner and the extent to which a settlor can oust the default law.62
We are not told where the line is to be drawn, nor, of course, was such a
line drawn with any precision under the Uniform Trust Code.63
VI. THE APPLICATION OF THE GOOD FAITH
STANDARD TO PARTNERSHIPS

IN

CONTRACT

A. Historical Partnership Fiduciary Standards
Unlike the law of trusts, the law of partnership has been folded into
the law of contract: jettisoning fiduciary duty as its governing principle
58

Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 11, at 427.
Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 6, at 671.
60 Id. at 655.
61 Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 45, at 1122-3.
62 Id., at 1123.
63 This is not meant as a criticism of the Uniform Trust Code. Indeed, it is one of its
great strengths: the Uniform Trust Code was intentionally structured to permit courts to
continue to have the traditional discretion to decide where the lines ought to be drawn in
any particular case. See infra notes 84-5 and accompanying text.
59
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and substituting in its stead a standard of contract law good faith
dealings.
Historically, the fiduciary obligation of partners was a defining
characteristic of a partnership:
If nothing else could have been said with confidence about
partnerships on the eve of promulgation of the UPA in 1914, it
was that the relationship was fiduciary in character. Thus, regardless of the contractual structure to which the partners
agreed, the foundation of the relationship was a matter of status, not contract. Simply by virtue of being partners, the participants owed each other certain general obligations of
conduct: “The duty of each partner to exercise toward the
others the highest integrity and good faith is the very basis of
their mutual rights in all partnership matters.” Because the obligations were seen as arising by virtue of the status of the partners as partners, and not by their agreement, the remedy for
breach of the basic obligations was in tort, not in contract.64
Because the fiduciary duty existed independent of the partnership
agreement, it could override such an agreement. In an Illinois case,65
for example, the limited partners claimed that the general partner
“squeezed” them out by refusing to make sufficient distributions to
cover the taxes generated from the investment, then buying them out at
discount. The partnership involved a private placement promoted only
to “wealthy and sophisticated investors.” The agreement gave the general partner “sole discretion” as to partnership distributions.66 Nevertheless, the court held that the limited partners had a cause of action
based on an intrinsic general fiduciary duty owed by the general partner
that is separate from the terms of the agreement.67
64

Vestal, Fundamental Contractarian Error, supra note 13, at 524-6.
Labovitz v. Dolan, 545 N.E. 2d 304 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
66 Id. At 306. A provision, of course, purporting to give the general partner absolute
discretion as to partnership distributions can create gift tax issues. In Hackl v. Comm.,
118 T.C. 279, aff’d. 335 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2003), the Tax Court held that a transfer of
limited partnership units did not qualify as annual exclusion gifts because the gifts did not
confer upon the donee-children immediate use, possession, or enjoyment of the transferred property. In part, the Tax Court based the decision on a distribution clause much
like that in Labovitz. For the failure of a general fiduciary duty coming to the rescue, see
Price v. Comm., T.C. Memo. 2010-2, 7 (“[P]etitioners contend that the general partner
has a ‘strict fiduciary duty’ to make income distributions to the donees. We are not persuaded that such a fiduciary duty, if it exists, establishes a present interest. . .where the
limited partner lacks withdrawal rights.”).
67 See also, Wartski v. Bedford, 926 F.2d 11, 20 (C.A. 1st Mass. 1991) (“The fiduciary duty of partners is an integral part of the partnership agreement whether or not expressly set forth therein.”); BT-I v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 75 Cal. App. 4th 1406,
1412, 89 Cal. Rptr. 811, 816 (Cal. App. 4th 1999) (“We agree with several recent decisions
65
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Indeed, the traditional role of fiduciary duty in the partnership relationship was to enforce fairness beyond the letter of the written “deal”:
The rules (governing business relationships) are consistent,
however with a concept of persons as a society and with the
notion that economic and political competitions are played out
not in an environment of pre-Leviathan lawlessness, but on the
basis of a set of ground rules. In the laws of business organizations, fiduciary obligations traditionally have provided one of
those ground rules. It may be that fiduciary doctrine is not
crystal clear, in the sense of a rule requiring traffic to stop at
red lights. But the argument from certainty can be overblown.
Dean Weidner suggests that a principle motivation behind the
“reformation” of fiduciary rules was the desire of lawyers to be
certain that their negotiated agreements would be upheld. For
lawyers to argue that fiduciary duty creates significant uncertainty is specious.
*
*
*
We should move away from rhetoric and confront reality. The
call to self-abnegation in fiduciary case law has never quite
been the reality. No judge, not even Cardozo, appears to have
expected partners to cast aside their worldly longings. What
the language conveys is an attitude, a way of thinking about
the relationship, which is not at all ambiguous for the language
in which it is couched. It is the attitude of the impartial spectator, of the person who desires the approbation of his peers, as
well as his own self-respect. It is an attitude that expresses the
ideal that some kinds of competition and some forms of risk
taking are quite appropriate in some circumstances and not in
others. It is an attitude well expressed in Labovitz v. Dolan.
In Labovitz, one of the partners stated: “The risk we took was
that the business would not succeed. We did not take the risk
that the business would succeed so well that the general partner would squeeze us out and take the investment for
himself.”68
B. Partnership Fiduciary Standards Under RUPA and RULPA
Until recently, Justice Cardozo’s “punctilio of an honor” was alive
and well: “As a fiduciary, a partner must consider his or her partners’
holding that a limited partnership agreement cannot relieve the general partner of its
fiduciary duties in matters fundamentally related to the partnership business.”).
68 Mitchell, The Naked Emperor, supra note 13, at 485-6.
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welfare, and refrain from acting for purely private gain.”69 The 1997 Revised Uniform Partnership Act and the 2001 Revised Uniform Limited
Partnership Act70, however, move away from a reliance on this broad
fiduciary duty to regulate partner conduct. Instead, these Acts each limit
fiduciary duty to a duty of loyalty, which is further limited (“cabined”)
to specific conduct instead of being a general concept tailored by courts
to cover a broad array of impermissible conduct.71 The enumerated categories of conduct “are exclusive and encompass the entire duty of loyalty.”72 Both model acts are backstopped by an obligation of good faith
and fair dealing which “is a contract concept” not a fiduciary duty.73
Thus, under the contractarian theory adopted under the acts, there
are very limited mandatory rules governing partner relations: a
shrunken duty of loyalty (to the extent that duty is not further restricted
by agreement) and the contract obligation of good faith. This is quite
different than the role that fiduciary duty traditionally played as the fundamental principle governing partner relations with the power to trump
specific authority contained in the partnership agreement:
Questions about whether these rules (the UPA provisions) are
default rules or mandatory rules do not arise simply because
textual analysis raises the inevitable comparisons. They arise
because different policy conclusions could be reached by different people. A libertarian, free-market oriented policy
maker is likely to suggest that all the rules governing the relations among the partners should be merely default rules – that
partners ought to be held to whatever bargain the negotiate. A
more parentalistic policy maker, on the other hand, would be
more inclined to support mandatory fiduciary duties to protect
minority partners. For example, a parentalistic might resist the
69 Wartski v. Bedford, 926 F. 2d 11, 20 (C.A. 1st. Mass. 1991) (quoting from Meehan
v. Shaughnessy, 404 Mass. 419, 535 N.E. 2d 1255, 1263 (1989)).
70 The revision of the partnership act is commonly referred to as “RUPA” whereas
the revision of the limited partnership act is commonly referred to as “ReRULPA” to
distinguish it from the 1982 revision.
71 The restricted duty of loyalty is problematic because of the essential role that it
plays in the fiduciary relationship. Boxx, supra note 7, at 280 (“The duty of loyalty has
been called ‘the essence of the fiduciary relationship’ and even has been considered an
expression synonymous with fiduciary.”). RUPA § 404 states that the fiduciary duties are
limited to that of loyalty and a separate duty of care which duty, in point of fact, is not a
fiduciary duty but rather the “duty” not to engage in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct or knowing violations of law.
72 REV. UNIF. PART. ACT § 404, cmt. (1997) See also REV. UNIF. PART. ACT
§ 103(b)(3)(i) (1997) which provides that this truncated duty of loyalty, while not permitted to be eliminated totally, may be further precluded from operating on specific types or
categories of conduct identified by the partnership agreement.
73 REV. UNIF. PART. ACT § 404, cmt. (1997).
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conclusion that a minority partner should be permitted to contract away his access to partnership books and records.
The Draft Committee wanted to make clear that all but a very
few of the rules governing the relations among partners are
merely default rules. It was only in rare situations that the
Committee felt that the rules should be mandatory.
Mandatory rules governing the relations among partners are
essentially parentalistic, and the Committee felt that, with only
very limited exception, adults in nonconsumer transactions are
old enough and wise enough to be held to their agreements.74
Under the contractarian model, of course, the parties could be free
to adopt provisions that would, in effect, reinstate a general fiduciary
duty to govern the relationship between the general partner and the
limited.75
The contractarian concept of good faith and fair dealing, and the
very limited notion of loyalty under the revised acts, are not effective
substitutes for a broad fiduciary duty that used to regulate partner con74 Donald J. Weidner, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act Midstream: Major Policy Decisions, 21 U. TOL. L. REV. 825, 828 (1990). Professor Weidner is the Reporter for
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act. “Parentalistic” is used instead of “paternalistic”
presumably to accommodate the changed demographics of the Bench which, but for the
adoption of RUPA or RULPA, may continue to be inclined to impose normative values
to protect vulnerable minority partners.
75 In theory, the freedom to reinsert fiduciary duty into a partnership agreement
may exist, but market forces may conspire against this remedy. Charles W. Murdock,
Limited Liability Companies in the Decade of the 1990s: Legislative and Case Law Developments and Their Implications for the Future, 56 BUS. LAW. 499, 530 (Feb. 2001):
The issue of fiduciary duties has been framed by contractarians as embodying a
choice between a statutory approach which is paternalistic and one which is
contractual. By way of illustration, if a paternalistic approach is chosen, the
default provision in the statute would be to provide for the broad and general
existence of fiduciary duties and then, if necessary, let the parties contract to
limit such duties. On the other hand, in a contractarian approach, the statutes
would be silent or would have limited fiduciary duties and would permit the
parties, if they chose, by contract to impose additional obligations upon themselves. . . Thus, we have two approaches to drafting a statute, one paternalistic,
seeking to protect people by leaving fiduciary duties as the default provision in
the statute, and the other contractarian, which leaves people free to fend for
themselves and create whatever protections they need. To sharpen the issue as
to which approach is more appropriate, it is also well to postulate, as caricature,
that there are two types of business arrangements as well. One situation would
envision sophisticated people engage in a significant transaction in which substantial funds are involved, including the funds to obtain sophisticated advice.
In the other situation, postulate that the investors are less sophisticated, funds in
general are limited, and sophisticated advice is less available, not only because
of cost but also the nature of legal practice in the area.
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duct. In a Maryland case,76 the court applied the “good faith” in contract standard to police partner conduct, instead of the traditional
fiduciary duty of common law. Predictably, the court focused on the
subjective intent of the partner rather than on that partner’s conduct per
se. In this case, the author of numerous techno-thriller novels (Tom
Clancy) and his ex-wife (Ms. King) created a limited partnership for the
purpose of developing and marketing a series of novels using Mr.
Clancy’s name but ghost written by another writer picked for the job
because of his skill “to affect a ‘Clancyesque’ style of writing.”77 The
partnership entered into a joint venture with a third party to effectuate
the project and a series of 12 books were released – all best sellers. At
that point, Mr. Clancy announced that he was going to withdraw permission for the joint venture to use his name on further books.
The partnership agreement authorized Mr. Clancy to engage in
other business ventures, even ventures competing with the partnership.
The issue was whether any duty of loyalty owed by Mr. Clancy to the
partnership and his partner would preclude such action. Under prior
law, of course, a general fiduciary duty would trump any partnership
agreement term to the contrary: “Clancy concedes that, contract law
aside, his pertinent actions, which animated King’s suit, would violate
the fiduciary duty he owed to [the partnership]”78under the law of Maryland before the adoption of the 1997 Revised Uniform Partnership
Act. Under the new act, however, the court held that Mr. Clancy
needed only to show that he acted in good faith with his business partner even if his actions were adverse to the partnership. If, on the other
hand, he acted out of personal spite against her, he would have
breached his obligation of good faith dealings. The good faith/bad faith
distinction is a question of fact and the case was remanded for trial to
determine that fact.
C. Shortcomings as Applied to Trusts
The weakness of a good faith/bad faith analysis is that it may punish
the forthright and reward the cunning. In Clancy, the court uses an illustration from the television comedy, Jerry Seinfeld, to highlight that
the good faith standard is a subjective test based on a partner’s motive
rather than on the consequences of a partner’s overt acts:
Jerry Seinfeld, perhaps an unlikely legal illustrator, once epitomized the duty of good faith in contract. In an episode of his
76 Clancy v. King , 405 Md. 541, 954 A.2d 1092 (2008) (Harrell, J.). Maryland had
adopted RUPA which governed this case.
77 Mr. Clancy gave the series the benefit of his name and reputation but only
“glanced at a few” of the books in the series never reading them. Id. at 549 and 1095.
78 Id. at 554 and 1099-1100.
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television show, Jerry’s character purchased a jacket at a men’s
clothing shop. The terms of the contract permitted Jerry to return the item for a refund at his discretion. When Jerry attempted to return the jacket after an unrelated personal
quarrel with the salesman, the following discussion took place.
“Jerry:
Clerk:
Jerry:
Clerk:
Jerry:

Excuse me, I’d like to return this jacket.
Certainly. May I ask why?
For spite.
Spite?
That’s right. I don’t care for the salesman that sold
it to me.
Clerk:
I don’t think you can return an item for spite.
Jerry:
What do you mean?
Clerk:
Well, if there was some problem with the garment.
If it were unsatisfactory in some way, then we could
do it for you, but I’m afraid spite doesn’t fit into any
of our conditions for a refund.
Jerry:
That’s ridiculous, I want to return it. What’s the
difference what the reason is?
Clerk:
Let me speak to the manager . . . excuse me . . .
Bob!
Bob:
What seems to be the problem?
Jerry:
Well, I want to return this jacket and she asked me
why and I said for spite and now she won’t take it
back.
Bob:
Well you already said spite so. . ..
Jerry:
But I changed my mind.
Bob:
No, you said spite. Too late.”
Seinfeld: The Wig Master (NBC original television broadcast
4 April 1996).
In attempting to exercise his contractual discretion out of “spite,”
Jerry breached his duty to act in good faith towards the other party to
the contract. Jerry would have been authorized to return the jacket if, in
his good faith opinion, it did not fit or was not an attractive jacket. He
may not return the jacket, however, for the sole purpose of denying to
the other party the value of the contract. Jerry’s post hoc rationalization
that he was returning the jacket because he did not “want it” was rejected properly by Bob as not credible.79
79 Id., at note 27. Clancy was a split decision by the Maryland Court of Appeals. The
dissent pointed to language in the partnership agreement that suggested that the general
partner was to be governed by fiduciary duty. Thus, the dissent would have applied the
traditional fiduciary duty over-ride to the case to find a breach of that general duty. Not
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It may be unusual for courts to look to television programs for guidance in applying contract terms to partnerships. In point of fact, however, the Jerry Seinfeld example closely parallels Professor Burton’s
example involving a tenant’s diversion of business from the store governed by a gross receipts rental to one not so covered. Both examples
illustrate the essential subjective nature of the contract good faith
standard.80
D. The RULLC Act Contrasted
It is perhaps telling that the last uniform business entity act that
addressed this issue retreated to the traditional, trust-inspired, fiduciary
duty standard to govern relations among its members. In fact, the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (2006) pointedly did not
limit the fiduciary duty owed by its members to each other or to the
entity:
Until the promulgation of RUPA, it was almost axiomatic that:
(i) fiduciary duties reflect judge-made law; and (ii) statutory
formulations can express some of that law but do not exhaustively codify it. The original UPA was a prime example of this
approach.
In an effort to respect freedom of contract, bolster predictability, and protect partnership agreements from second-guessing,
the Conference decided that RUPA should fence or “cabin in”
all fiduciary duties within a statutory formulation. That decisurprisingly, it cited Justice Cardozo’s formulation from Meinhard to illustrate the sweep
of such a duty. Id., at 576-7 and 1113.
80 RUPA § 404(d) provides that a partner shall discharge his or her duties consistent
“with the obligation of good faith and fair dealings.” The Comment states that fair dealing suggests an objective meaning: “’Good faith’ clearly suggests a subjective element,
while ‘fair dealing’ implies an objective component.” REV. UNIF. PART. ACT § 404 cmt.
(1997). The drafters of RUPA and RULPA did not define these terms but left interpretation to the courts. Given that these acts consciously rejected broad application of the
traditional fiduciary duty to regulate partner conduct in favor of the reduced contractarian standard, however, one must assume that courts will not interfere except in the
most egregious instances of bad faith dealings. That is not to say that any behavior may
pass muster if justified by an appropriately expressed motive. At base, motive is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. Thus, in Clancy, the case was remanded
for a trial to determine why Mr. Clancy decided to withdraw use of his name. Similarly, in
Alloy v. Wills Family Trust, 944 A.2d 1234 (2008), the Maryland intermediate appellate
court, applying RULPA under Washington, D.C. law, remanded the issue of whether a
change in distribution pattern was part of a squeeze-out scheme and therefore constituted bad faith conduct. Ironically, the Alloy court cited Labovitz for the proposition that
partnership distributions must be guided by the general partner’s duty of loyalty and
good faith.
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sion was followed without re-consideration in ULLCA and
ULPA (2001).
This Act takes a different approach. After lengthy discussion
in the drafting committee and on the floor of the 2006 Annual
Meeting, the Conference decided that: (i) the “corral” created
by RUPA does not fit in the very complex and variegated
world of LLCs; and (ii) it is impracticable to cabin all LLCrelated fiduciary duties within a statutory formulation.
As a result, this Act: (i) eschews “only” and “limited to” – the
words RUPA used in an effort to exhaustively codify fiduciary
duty; (ii) codifies the core of the fiduciary duty of loyalty; but
(iii) does not purport to discern every possible category of
overreaching. One important consequence is to allow courts to
continue to use fiduciary duty concepts to police disclosure obligations in member-to-member and member-LLC
transactions.81
The about-face in the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company
Act is, of course, a remarkable development given that partnerships and
limited liability companies are so similar in most other respects. One
anticipates that this issue is not finally resolved and that it may be revisited in the partnership context.82
VII. CONCLUSION
Historically, the common law of trusts and the principles of equity
did not look to contract law when applying a good faith standard to
trustees. Instead, courts have consistently applied a good faith standard
within the context of a broad fiduciary duty of loyalty. The insurgent
theory (advanced in academic debates and largely adopted by the new
81

REV. UNIF. LLC ACT § 409, cmt. (2006).
Indeed, some states are following the LLC approach when “adopting” RUPA and
RULPA. Dean Allan W. Vestal and Thomas E. Rutledge, The Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001) Comes to Kentucky: An Owner’s Manual, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 411, 453-4
(2007): “KyULPA has modified the uniform language to eliminate the exclusivity of the
fiduciary obligation to those of care and loyalty and further eliminated the exclusivity of
the formula employed by both. . . These modifications will allow a greater scope for the
development of the common law than would be anticipated under the uniform language. . . While ULPA recited the standard of care as being refraining from ‘grossly
negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of the law,’
KyULPA adopts an aspirational model for the standard of care, expecting of the partners
that they act ‘with the care that a reasonable person in a like position would exercise
under similar circumstances and in a manner that the partner believes to be in the best
interest of the partnership.’ This aspirational standard avoids the ‘socially impoverished
message’ of the RUPA/ULPA duty of care formula and preserves an expectancy in the
partners that, while perhaps not that of Cardozo’s ‘trustee’ is still meaningful.”
82
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uniform partnership acts) to reduce fiduciary relationships to mere contract, to the morals of the market place, may be attractive to scholars of
an economic bent, but it provides a poor substitute for the common law
rules governing trustee conduct. Good faith under the law of contract is
a concept devoid of the normative values that historically governed trustee conduct and those minimalistic standards should not be incorporated
in the law of trusts.
The Uniform Trust Code fills a void: “[T]he trust law in many
States is thin” and the uniform act “will provide the States with precise,
comprehensive, and easily accessible guidance on trust law questions.”83
To a large degree, the Uniform Trust Code “codifies the common law,”
but also makes some significant changes.84 The drafters of the uniform
act, however, purposely employed a light touch: “[E]fforts to reduce
rules to writing will result in excess rigidity and insufficient discretion
vested in the courts to adopt to changing conditions. Even on issues the
drafters have elected to codify, the UTC in many cases, does not specify
every detail, the drafters preferring flexibility and brevity to greater precision.”85 Also, of course, “the common law of trusts and principles of
equity supplement” the Act.86
The Uniform Trust Code, by design, permits the traditional norms
that governed the exercise of trustee discretion to continue to be enforced and refined by that common law – a process that earned the trust
Maitland’s high tribute.87

83

UNIF. TRUST CODE (2005), Prefatory notes.
David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provision and Policy Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 143, 144 (2002).
85 Id. At 212.
86 UNIF. TRUST CODE §106 (2005).
87 Maitland, supra note 23, at 23 (Professor Maitland famously described the trust as
“the most distinctive achievement of English lawyers. It seems to us almost essential to
civilization.”). Conceptually, rules regulating complex human relationships, like those involved in trusts or, for that matter, partnerships, may be more perfectly developed by the
evolutionary process of the common law as opposed to the attempting to create such
rules from a universal theory of human relationships based, in this case, on contract:
“What has been said (about the development of judge made law) will explain the failure
of all theories which consider the law only from its formal side; whether they attempt to
deduce a corpus from a priori postulates, or fall into the humbler error of supposing the
science of the law to reside in the elegantia juris, or logical cohesion of part with part.
The truth is, that the law always approaching, and never reaching, consistency. It is forever adapting new principles from life and at one end, and it always retains old ones from
history at the other, which have not yet been absorbed or sloughed off. It will come
entirely consistent only when it ceases to grow.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE
COMMON LAW, LECTURE I-EARLY FORMS OF LIABILITY (Project Gutenberg 2000,
www.gutenberg.org).
84
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